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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
:

Case No. 20010970-CA

:

Priority No. 2 (incarcerated)

ROBIN M. LAFOND,
Defendant/Petitioner.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Ms. Lafond maintains all positions as they were originally set forth in her opening
brief. She responds to the State's brief as follows.
Under well established law from the United States and Utah Supreme Courts, when
an officer demands that a person identify and/or produce the contents of her pocket, the
officer conducts a search, not a frisk as the State contends.
In the instant matter, the officer searched Ms. Lafond absent probable cause or exigent
circumstances, and in so doing, violated the Fourth Amendment and Article I § 14 of the
federal and state constitutions.
The officer's questioning of Lafond also violated the scope of detention.
This Court should reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress and
remand this matter to the trial court for withdrawal of the conditional plea.

ARGUMENT
L
SEARCHES AND FRISKS DISTINGUISHED
With regard to whether the officer frisked or searched Ms. Lafond, the State argues
in its summary that "all facts point to a frisk." State's brief at 7. In its argument, the State
focuses on the portion of the officer's conduct that actually did consist of a frisk, i.e., when
he patted down the exterior of Lafond's pockets, and implicitly argues that if an officer
demands that a person identify and produce the contents of their pockets, no search has
occurred. State's brief at 15-17.
While it is true that the officer here patted down Lafond's pockets at one point (R.
127 at 9), before he did so, he demanded that she tell him what was in her pockets, and that
she remove the bags she had placed in her pockets (R. 127 at 9).
Contrary to the State's argument, these facts do not all point to a frisk, but amount to
a search under well established federal constitutional law.
In Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court granted police officers permission to
conduct limited pat-downs of the exterior of suspects' clothing for weapons, and approved
of frisks which are confined in their scope to the least intrusive means necessary to protect
the police from potentially armed suspects. See id. at 30. The Court expressly distinguished
properly limited Terry frisks for weapons from "general exploratory search[es]" for
Whatever evidence of criminal activity" might be found. See kiln this case, where the officer did not initially pat down Ms. Lafond for weapons, but
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instead demanded to know what she had put in her pockets, and demanded that she remove
the contents of her pockets (R. 127 at 9), the officer exceeded the proper scope of a Terry
weapons frisk, and conducted a general exploratory search for whatever evidence might be
found. Cf. id. See also Sibron v. New York. 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968);1 United States v.
Santillanes. 848 F.2d 1103, 1109 (10th Cir. 1988).2
While the State would like this Court to believe that there is no authority for the
proposition that an officer may not demand to know or see the contents of a suspect's

1

In Sibron, the Court explained,
The search for weapons approved in Terry consisted solely of a limited patting
of the outer clothing of the suspect for concealed objects which might be used
as instruments of assault. Only when he discovered such objects did the officer
in Terry place his hands in the pockets of the men he searched. In this case,
with no attempt at an initial limited exploration for arms, Patrolman Martin
thrust his hand into Sibron's pocket and took from him envelopes of heroin.
His testimony shows that he was looking for narcotics, and he found them.
The search was not reasonably limited in scope to the accomplishment of the
only goal which might conceivably have justified its inception — the protection
of the officer by disarming a potentially dangerous man. Such a search violates
the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment, which protects the sanctity of the
person against unreasonable intrusions on the part of all government agents.
Id.
2

In Santillanes. the Tenth Circuit also recognized,
Furthermore, the search for weapons should be a limited intrusion. The
Supreme Court in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917, 88
S. Ct. 1889, noted that "the search for weapons approved in Terry consisted
solely of a limited patting of the outer clothing of the suspect for concealed
objects which might be used as instruments of assault." In tne instant case, the
detective went beyond patting appellant's outer clothing. He reached into
appellant's pockets where he discovered a beer can and a roll of money. The
detective's conduct in this case cannot be considered minimally intrusive. The
actions of Detective Haury and the other officer exceeded the scope of a
permissible frisk and consequently violated appellant's Fourth Amendment
rights.
3

pockets under the Terry frisk doctrine, see State's brief at 15-16 (claiming a lack of authority
for Lafond's "novel" proposition to this effect), page 13 of the State's brief cites to State v.
Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), a Utah case which also recognizes that when an
officer asks suspects to empty their pockets, this conduct amounts to a search.

In

Whittenback. an officer investigating suspected laundromat theft demanded that the suspects
empty their pockets. See id. at 106. Having addressed Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
earlier in the opinion, the Whittenback court found that the officer's conduct in demanding
that the suspects empty their pockets constituted a search which was lawful as a search
incident to arrest. See id. at 106-107.
The State argues that Lafond did not raise this issue in the trial court, and that the
Court may reach the issue only through the plain error doctrine, which requires errors to be
both plain and prejudicial before they will be addressed for the first time on appeal. State's
brief at 15. citing State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
As a factual matter, at the hearing on the motion to suppress, while defense counsel
primarily focused on whether a Terry frisk was justified at all, counsel consistently
characterized the officer's conduct as a search, and argued that the search of Ms. Lafond was
unacceptable under Terry and unsupported by probable cause (e.g. R. 128 at 5).
Assuming arguendo that defense counsel's argument was insufficient to otherwise
preserve the issue, the preliminary hearing transcript which was the factual basis for the
motion to suppress clearly and without contradiction indicates that the officer asked Lafond
to identify and remove the contents of her pockets prior to any frisk (R. 127 at 9).
4

At the time of the hearing and ruling on the motion to suppress, thirty-plus- year- old
law clearly recognized that such conduct amounts to a search and is not properly viewed as
a frisk. See Terry; Sibron; Santillanes; and Whittenback, supra.
Thus, the trial court plainly erred in failing to recognize that the officer violated the
Fourth Amendment and Article I § 14 in demanding that Lafond identify and produce the
contents of her pockets, and even if the trial court should not have recognized the error, given
its highly prejudicial nature, this Court could and should correct it under the plain error
doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29,35 and n.8 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S.
814 (1989)(plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness prong
may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in hindsight
than it likely was before the trial court.).
The State has not argued that the search of Ms. Lafond which occurred when the
officer demanded to know and see the contents of her pockets was justified by probable
cause or exigent circumstances, and thus has not sustained its burden to justify the conduct
of the officer under the Fourth Amendment or under Article I § 14. See, e.g.. State v.
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)(warrantless search requires proof of exigent
circumstances and probable cause under Article I § 14 of Utah Constitution); State v.
Hodson, 866 P.2d 556,560 (Utah App. 1993)(to justify warrantless body search, government
must establish probable cause, exigent circumstances, and reasonable method of search),
rev'd on other grounds, 907 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1995).
5

Because the officer's warrantless search violated the scope of detention and Article
I § 14 and the Fourth Amendment, this Court should rule that all resultant evidence must be
excluded. See Larocco, supra, (adopting exclusionary rule under state constitution); Wong
Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471 (1963)(exclusionary rule applies to Fourth Amendment
violation).

IL
THE SCOPE OF QUESTIONING
In its summary of the argument the State argues that the officer was within bounds in
asking if there were alcohol or marijuana in the car, because he saw a Crown Royal bag next
to the driver, who had a prior DUI conviction, and green flakes in a cup holder. State's brief
at 7.
Only later in its argument does the State acknowledge the true content and sequence
of questions, wherein the officer asked if there was anything illegal in the car and received
a negative response, wherein the officer then asked if there were any weapons or alcohol in
the car and received a negative response, wherein the officer then asked if Lafond had any
marijuana in the car and received a negative response, and wherein the officer then asked if
anyone had smoked marijuana in the car recently, and received Lafond's answer that she did
not think so, but did not know if anyone had because she had recently loaned the car to
someone else for a week, and wherein the officer then asked if he could search the car and
Lafond acquiesced (R. 127 at 7-8). See State's brief at 9-12.
While the State argues that the officer's questions were the most efficient and least
6

intrusive means of confirming or dispelling his suspicions, see id., his questioning should
have stopped once Ms. Lafond told him that there was nothing illegal in her car.
Nonetheless, the officer proceeded to ask if there was any alcohol, weapons or marijuana in
her car, if anyone had smoked marijuana in her car recently, and if he could search her car
(R. 127 at 9).
The generalized and redundant nature of the questions belie the notions that the
officer was duty bound to investigate specific articulable suspicions, or was trying to conduct
an expeditious investigation, and demonstrate instead that the officer was fishing around for
anything to confirm his generalized hunches about Ms. Lafond.
Particularly after he received all of her answers reflecting that there was nothing
unlawful or improper in her car, the officer had no reason to ask to search her car, and should
have allowed her to proceed on her way. See, e.g.. State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, 17
P.3d 1135, cert granted, 26 P.3d 35, 2001 Utah LEXIS 102 (recognizing that questioning
violated proper scope of traffic stop), discussed at length in Lafond's opening brief.
The State argues that because Lafond did not seek suppression of any weapons, the
Court should find that the officer's asking about weapons was harmless. State's brief at 9
n.l. The State cites no authority for this proposition, which is inconsistent with wellestablished law that if any officer asks questions which go beyond the original basis for the
stop or are not supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion, such questioning exceeds
the scope of detention and violates the Fourth Amendment and Article I § 14. See, e.g..
State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, 17 P.3d 1135, cert granted, 26 P.3d 35, 2001 Utah
7

LEXIS 102. The notion that a scope violation is rendered "harmless" if no contraband
matching a question is found is also inconsistent with well-established law that the legality
of a search does not turn on what the search turns up. See, e.g.. State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403,
415 (Utah App. 1994)("Picking possible justifications after the fact is an entirely
unsatisfactory manner by which to decide whether evidence should be suppressed.' A search
is not to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does
not change character from what is dug up subsequently. '")(citations omitted).
This case does not call for this Court to assess the merits of United States v. Holt, 264
F.3d 1215, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 2001), cited in footnote 1 on page 9 of the State's brief for the
proposition that officers may ask about the presence of weapons during the course of traffic
stops, absent particularized suspicion. This is so because Holt is expressly limited to officers
asking about the presence of loaded weapons, and turns in part on the court's opinion that
the defendant's privacy interests were diminished by an Oklahoma statute which requires
people to inform the police if they are carrying concealed weapons pursuant to a permit. See
Holt, 264 P.2d at 1222-23. Holt is thus inapposite to this case.
Conclusion
This Court should reverse the trial court's order denying the motion to suppress, and
remand this case to the trial court for withdrawal of Ms. Lafond's conditional plea and
dismissal.
DATED this

/

day of

AJYA

8

, 2002.
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